Theory[ edit ] As proponents of free-market anarchismBenjamin Tucker   and Gustave de Molinari first explicitly proposed for-profit private defense agencies. The concept later was advanced and expanded upon by anarcho-capitalists who consider the state to be illegitimate, and therefore believe defense is something that should be provided or determined privately by individuals and firms competing in a free market.
Theory[ edit ] As proponents of free-market anarchismBenjamin Tucker   and Gustave de Molinari first explicitly proposed for-profit private defense agencies.
The concept later was advanced and expanded upon by anarcho-capitalists who consider the state to be illegitimate, and therefore believe defense is something that should be provided or determined privately by individuals and firms competing in a free market.
Essays on the Theory and History of Security Production. Rothbard in For a New Liberty: The Libertarian Manifesto and David D. Friedman in The Machinery of Freedom expand substantially on the idea.
Both hold that a PDA would be part of a privatized system of lawpolicecourtsinsurance companies and arbitration agencies who are responsible for preventing and dealing with aggression.
In this environment, victimless crimes and "crimes against the state" would be rendered mootand the legal realm would be limited to contractual disputes and tort damages, as from assaultburglarypollutionand all other forms of aggression.
Their survival depends on quality of service leading to a wide customer base, rather than the ability to extract funds via the force of law, as is true of states. Customers and markets would thus dictate that PDAs minimize offensive tendencies and militarization in favor of a pure defense.
Anarcho-capitalists believe such privatization and decentralization of defense would eliminate the credibility of, and popular support for, the state.
As a private firm offering individually determined defense, the PDA provides a model for how an entirely private defense would work in a free market. John Frederic Kosanke argues that the need for large-scale defense is minimized in direct inverse proportion to the extent of domestic control by the state.
Since the greater number of proprietors makes surrender more costly to an aggressor than a relatively authoritarian region, vulnerability to attack is less likely. Furthermore, since individuals minding their own business pose little threat to neighboring regions, official or ideological justification by those neighbors for attacking them is also proportionately diminished.
They generally hold that any monopoly is "bad" for consumers because, shielded from potential new entrants into his area of production, the price of his product X will be higher and its quality lower than otherwise.
Yet they simultaneously hold that security must be undertaken by the government, which is a territorial monopoly of law and order the ultimate decision maker and enforcer. Hoppe holds that the two propositions are clearly incompatible. That the interests of the consumer of any commodity whatsoever should always prevail over the interests of the producer.
Now in pursuing these principles, one arrives at this rigorous conclusion: That the production of security should, in the interests of the consumers of this intangible commodity, remain subject to the law of free competition.
That no government should have the right to prevent another government from going into competition with it, or to require consumers of security to come exclusively to it for this commodity.
Noting that advocates of PDAs typically argue that abuses would be prevented by the presence of rival agencies acting under the authority of rulings made by arbitrators empowered by inter-agency arbitration agreementsCowen opines, "The adjudication network is stable only if it can use force to put down outlaw agencies that do not accept its higher-order arbitration decisions.
Such a network could also use force to put down firms that do not adhere to the collusive agreement. State-subsidized militaries, in contrast, are granted a distinct offensive advantage, resulting in a proportionately greater tendency toward monopolization.
Aggression and abuses by private defense agencies[ edit ] Randall G. This action seems to be a profit-maximizing strategy; hence, protection firms that do not prey on noncustomers may not survive. Honest and productive individuals would dissociate themselves from it, fearing that it might use its aggressive force against them in the event of a dispute; or that they might become accidental casualties when retaliatory force is used by one of its other victims; or that their own reputation would suffer due to their ties to it.
The employees and leaders of such an agency as well could face personal civil liability for their involvement, and the agency would not be shielded by sovereign immunity. High-quality employees would presumably be less willing to be involved with such an organization.
The objection that a tyrant might take over is actually a devastating argument against government. But the point is that in a stateless society there would be no regular, legalized channel for crime and aggression, no government apparatus the control of which provides a secure monopoly for invasion of person and property To create such an instrument de novo is very difficult, and, indeed, almost impossible; historically, it took State rulers centuries to create a functioning State apparatus.
The gold warehouse is owned by an entrepreneur who has his own defense agency and the gold in the warehouse also have owners that have hired their own respective defense agencies. Murphy opines that given the privatization of other services in an anarcho-capitalist society, "We must consider that in such an environment, the law-abiding majority would have all sorts of mechanisms at their disposal, beyond physical confrontation.
Once private judges had ruled against a particular rogue agency, the private banks could freeze its assets up to the amount of fines levied by the arbitrators.
Bond further argues that some PDAs may reduce their risk of retaliation by carrying out anonymous sabotage or terrorist attacks. If the region being attacked has large stashes of valuable goods, they will most likely have very effective defense agencies stronger defense agencies for more valuable assets are logical and thus the fight against the invading defense agencies will inflict more cost upon the invaders.
Specifically, the free rider problemin which people refuse to pay for defense but instead rely on their neighbors to pay for defending the community, is said to make it inevitable that it be financed by taxes if an equitable allocation of costs is to be achieved.
According to anarcho-capitalist theorists, there are many ways by which this problem can be overcome or rendered irrelevant. Stromberg notes that the American Revolution occurred despite the fact that some individuals might have been free riders who benefited from it without funding it; he opines that successful defense of freedom often relies not on precise allocations of cost, but on "nationalism, religion, the desire for freedom, hatred of the enemy, social pressure to do the right thing, and so on," some of which might represent " enlightened self interest.
As is true for homeowners today, everyone would be responsible for buying or otherwise being covered by aggression insurance in order to protect themselves against catastrophic loss from foreign attack; in the event of an invasion, a claim would be filed with right of subrogationand the insurer would hire a private defense company to collect from the aggressor.
Anarcho-capitalists often argue, for instance, that the argument that taxation is needed to fund protection of liberty and property from aggression is a contradiction, because taxation itself requires aggression in order to be enforced.
Another argument comes from the fact that, unlike voluntary transactions, no demonstrated preference has been made by the taxpayer; so there is no objective way of showing that he is receiving a service he wants and needs, at a price that is fair.IPC Section 96 to of the penal code states the law relating to the right of private defence of person and property.
Remember, Right to Private Defence is an exception to rules of criminal liability and hence it depends on the situation and circumstances which will determine the fate of a case. There is no ‘by the book’ approach to this, and it will depend on a case to case basis .
Private defence requirements (1) Requirements of attack. The attack (a) must be unlawful (b) must be against interests which ought to be protected (c) must be threatening but not yet completed (2) Requirements of defence.
The defensive action (a) must be directed against the attacker. Private defence requirements (1) Requirements of attack. The attack (a) must be unlawful (b) must be against interests which ought to be protected (c) must be threatening but not yet completed (2) Requirements of defence.
The defensive action (a) must be directed against the attacker. The right of private defence does not extend to inflicting of more harm than it is necessary for the purpose of defence. In Mohinder Pal Jolly v State of Punjab , there was a dispute between the workers and the management over demand for wages.
Right of private defence of the body and of Property: Every person has a right, subject to the restrictions contained in Section 99, to defend- First-His own body, and the body of any other person, against any offence affecting the human body; Secondly-The property, whether movable or immovable, of himself or of any other person, against any.